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and argues for a nuanced and multifaceted approach for internal governance. For
this undertaking, we look at a little-examined control and auditing instrument, the
formalized audit procedures of Roman Catholic orders. These so-called visitations
are one important pillar in the monastic governance system to counter aberrations.
Utilizing surveys and interviews, we examine 96 Roman Catholic religious com-
munities in Austria, Germany and Switzerland, and connect these visitations pro-
cedures with rule violations and sexual abuse cases. We argue that communities
unaffected by scandals and rule violations rely strongly on process and clan control
to address inefficiency and misconduct; whereas, affected communities focus more
on business issues. We caution against the trend of relying predominantly on output-
based processes while suggesting a balance between different types of control
systems. Furthermore, we enhance the current discourse by considering imple-
mentation procedures of control. The religious orders attach great importance to the
way control measures are carried out. To steer the behavior of their members, many
successful orders even complement controls with personal support and identity
strengthening.
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1 Excesses and scandals in religious orders
Governance has become a permanent issue in public dialogue. Since the turn of the
twenty-first century, scandals of excessive manager compensation and fraudulent
bookkeeping, and, most notably, misconduct relating to the financial crisis, have
damaged the reputation of firms and triggered questions about the functioning of
markets (Di Pietra et al. 2010; Bachman et al. 2011). Some authors speak of a crisis
of governance (Magnan and Markarian 2011; Sun et al. 2011). The search for good
governance is of immediate concern in order to regain control and restore
confidence in the economic system and its leaders (Pirson and Turnbull 2011).
However, it is not only the economic world that laments scandals and crises. The
Roman Catholic Church and some of its religious orders have experienced turbulent
times. The revelation of child maltreatment, sexual abuse and authoritarian
education methods in many Catholic organizations shocked the German public in
the spring of 2010. The scandal made headline news for weeks. The immense
attention resulted in a meticulous review of suspect organizations (for an overview,
see Spiegel Online 2011, Die Zeit online 2010). Religious orders depend on their
moral integrity. Therefore, the principals—the leadership of the religious orders and
the Vatican—have a genuine interest in preventing such incidents. As such, the
search for good governance is a central concern in religious organizations.1
An inevitable task in dealing with fraud and misconduct in organizations is that
of controlling and monitoring members. An efficient functioning of organizations is
designed by means of an appropriate configuration of the control systems. Concepts
regarding (multiple) orientations of control have been known in the literature for a
long time, but have gained too little attention in practitioner, organization and
accounting literature (Malmi and Brown 2008; Sitkin et al. 2010). In the last decade
a growing number of scholars called for investigations into multiple control systems
and their effects (Alvesson and Ka¨rreman 2004; Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Ferreira
and Otley 2009; Grandori and Soda 2006; Kennedy and Widener 2008; Malmi and
Brown 2008; Sandelin 2008). However, such research is still in its infancy.
Thus, in this paper we contribute to the research of multiple control systems by
choosing the classic framework of Management Control Theory to investigate
specific monastic audit procedures. The four control archetypes: process, clan, input
and output control of Managerial Control Theory (Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1977,
1979; Thompson 1967; Turner and Makhija 2006) offer an appropriate theoretical
underpinning for the analysis of monastic control systems that allows us to examine
their effectiveness in relation to misconduct. Depending on the task environment
1 We use a broad and classical definition of governance: it is understood as the set of processes, customs,
policies, laws, and institutions affecting the way an organization is directed and controlled. The abuse
cases represent a massive governance failure in the religious orders.
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and the goods produced, different combinations of output, process, clan, or input
control are suggested to discipline members and reduce their misbehavior.
We chose to examine religious orders as a specific organizational form in the
non-profit sector for our investigation of multiple control orientations. There are
several reasons for this choice. First, in their long history, monastic organizations
followed their own paths to control their sisters, padres and brothers. Similarly to
other organizations, religious orders had to struggle with wastes of assets, laziness,
political intrigues or sexual misconduct (see Helvetia Sacra 1986, a historical
chronicle). Innovative organizational structures, for instance the religious orders
were pioneers in the division of labor and the work ethic, and they brought
considerable fortunes to many communities as far back as the early Middle Ages
(Kieser 1987). As a consequence, not only did the temptation toward misuse
increase, but over the centuries an intriguing governance system emerged. Second,
our focus is not on monastic governance systems as a whole (see Inauen et al.
2010a, b), but on one specific audit instrument—the monastic visitation. The latter
is interesting because it combines different forms of control in one procedure.
Additionally, visitations developed differently within the various religious com-
munities. Whereas some religious orders follow the trends in focusing on output
control measures in their visitation procedures (and therefore concentrate on the
economic situation of their community), many rely on process control and, in
particular, on clan control to audit the communal and spiritual life of their brothers
and sisters. Because of this diverging development, studying the little-known
visitations may lead to new insights in relation to multiple control systems. Finally,
the misuse scandals make the case of Catholic orders an important societal research
topic. It could be enlightening for other organizations to look at those failures from a
management control perspective.
To gain a better understanding of the visitations, we drew on qualitative and
quantitative data. First, we reviewed the literature on visitations, searched
constitutions of religious communities and interviewed monastic leaders. Second,
we empirically investigated the characteristics of visitations in various religious
orders. The analysis is based on a unique dataset that we collected between
November 2009 and April 2010. More than 100 representatives from 224 monastic
communities completed our comprehensive survey on monastic governance just
months before the scandals went public. This allowed us to analyze the relation
between characteristics of the different visitation systems and the misconduct of the
religious communities. For this purpose we combined the survey data with external
information on the abuse cases. We used logistic regression analysis to determine
what characteristics of the visitation systems are associated with higher probabilities
of sexual abuse and internal misconduct.
The results are relevant in respect to multiple orientations of control and, in
addition, throw a light on the scandals in the Catholic orders. One specific
characteristic of monastic visitations is the distinct coexistence of different types of
control in the monastic audits. Output measures are primarily applied to control
economic activities; whereas, process and clan control are used to monitor spiritual
and communal life. Interestingly and in line with the theory, the choice of emphasis
depends on the practice of a community. For example, where contemplation
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dominates monastic life, clan control is more likely to play a dominant role. Our
analysis indicates that visitation procedures can be an effective tool in preventing
misbehavior. The outcomes on child abuse and on rule violations suggest that a
focus on process and clan control has an impact on supervising principles and
spiritual life. In contrast, a one-sided orientation on output control increases the
probability of failures. We cannot explain why child abuse emerged in the monastic
communities or where the failures originated. It does seem that visitations can be
part of the solution though. If seriously applied and targeted, a positive preventive
effect may be expected. However, we conclude that it is not sufficient to rely solely
on appropriate types of control. For a successful auditing the type of implementation
is equally important. Three issues stand out and are supposed to ensure the
participation of the padres and brothers, hence enabling controls: trust in the
visitors, confidentiality and the meaningfulness of the procedures. Additionally, the
success of control increases if the visitations go hand-in-hand with identity
strengthening and personal support. In the best-case scenario, monastic audits
effectively combine process, clan and output controls with careful implementation
and elements of identity strengthening.
By investigating monastic audits, our analysis advances a multiple-orientations
approach to management control (Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Ferreira and Otley
2009; Malmi and Brown 2008). Most of the contributions refer to simple
archetypes of control, whereas complex control structures are not fully explained
(Caglio and Ditillo 2008). Using religious orders, we illuminate a multilayered
audit instrument in a non-profit-sector organization and, therefore, deliver a rare
empirical example in the field of multiple control systems. Organizations,
regardless of size, need various governance and control structures to properly
deal with the manifold challenges and contingency situations. We introduce the
Managerial Control Theory framework of Ouchi (1977, 1979) as a basis to analyze
multifaceted control systems and to bridge the gap between the fields of
management control and organization theory. In the particular case of monasteries,
we contribute to the development of the multiple control literature with two further
aspects. First, the specific orientation of visitations, namely the focus on spiritual
and community life, is fascinating. ‘‘Soft’’ factors, such as values, spirituality or
social interaction are not typically associated with auditing procedures. Internal
audits still concentrate primarily on finance, compliance and, more rarely,
performance issues (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012). However, in broadening
traditional audit procedures, the monastic approach could be a step toward better
governance. Second, we take a closer look at the accompanying factors of control.
In practice and literature, little attention is paid to the successful implementation of
control systems. A careful and comprehensible implementation of the procedures is
necessary to promote a functioning control system and to avoid adverse effects (De
Charms 1968; Deci and Ryan 1980; Frey 1992; Osterloh and Weibel 2008). In this
respect, we look also at the connection between the visitation procedures and
identity development, a rarely addressed issue in the discourse of control systems.
On a more practical level, the paper offers a new perspective on the misuse
scandals within the Catholic Church.
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2 Theoretical foundation
The following subsections detail the theoretical basis of this study. First, we review
the literature on control systems. Second, we present the characteristics of monastic
visitations as an audit instrument in detail.
2.1 Multiple orientations of control versus the one-fits-all approach
Control systems are critical for the efficient functioning of an organization (Meyer
and Gupta 1994; Meyer 2003). Numerous definitions of management control exist,
and many attempts have been made to determine its modes and mechanisms (for
reviews, see Caglio and Ditillo 2008; Chenhall 2003; Malmi and Brown 2008;
Merchant and Otley 2007). Two nearly unrelated research streams deal with the
contents of multiple orientations of control.
Whereas the field of management control is dominant in the audit and accounting
literature (Anthony and Govindarajan 2008; Merchant and Van der Stede 2012;
Simons 1990; 1995), organization theory is also concerned with the mechanisms of
control (e.g., Cardinal et al. 2010; Eisenhardt 1985; Ouchi 1979, 1980). Both
research paths build on similar theoretical underpinnings and also show several
theoretical overlaps. Through the conscious use of control the responsible agents try
to ensure that an organization’s members display expected behaviors (Osterloh and
Weibel 2006). The management control system is effective when it increases the
probability that employees will behave in ways consistent with the organization’s
objectives (Frost et al. 2012).
Concepts regarding multiple orientations of control have long been found in the
literature (e.g., Otley 1980), but hardly gained deserved attention (Sitkin et al.
2010). Most of the contributions refer to simple archetypes of control, ‘‘whereas,
more complex and varied combinations of control traits empirically observed are not
fully explained’’ (Caglio and Ditillo 2008: p. 866). However, empirical research
provides vast evidence that management control systems are large and complex sets
of elements that are loosely connected and interdependent (e.g., Ambos and
Schlegelmilch 2007; Carlsson-Wall et al. 2011; Frost et al. 2012; Gerdin 2005;
Martinez and Jarillo 1989; O’Donnell 2000; St. John and Harrison 1999).
Management control systems can be seen as packages which have to be dismantled
for a better understanding of their impact (Chenhall 2003; Dent 1990; Fisher 1998;
Flamholtz et al. 1985; Malmi and Brown 2008; Otley 1980). For instance, the way
control mechanisms relate to contingency variables depends on what other
mechanisms are applied simultaneously (Chenhall 2003; Fisher 1998). Despite this
realization, empirical and theoretical work on the topic is still rare (Abernethy and
Chua 1996; Alvesson and Ka¨rreman 2004; Grant 2003; Rost and Osterloh 2009).
The organization literature refers to additional dimensions that should also be
taken into account. Not only do the control systems as such play a role, but also
social capital (Kirsch et al. 2010) or trust (Fryxell et al. 2002) have been established
as important antecedents for the effectiveness of control systems. Furthermore, to
ensure an efficient audit, appropriate implementation of the control processes has to
be considered. How controls are perceived is crucial. In this context, the literature
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primarily refers to the motivation crowding effect. The latter suggests that external
interventions and control may undermine intrinsic motivation. According to
Motivation Crowding Theory (Deci et al. 1999; Frey and Jegen 2001), monitoring
measures are most effective when they are not perceived as controlling. A vote of no
confidence or a lack of appreciation can result in a crowding out of motivation, thus
leading to reduced performance and more misbehavior. By contrast, if controls are
seen as appropriate and useful, unintended effects are more likely to be absent and
we can expect members to cooperate in the procedures—ensuring efficient control
(Adler and Borys 1996). For example, procedural fairness and the consistency or
impartiality of the controllers mitigate negative monitoring effects (Frey and
Osterloh 2002; Tyler and Blader 2000).
Finally, an audit can include additional supportive tasks, such as developing
identity. The literature has neglected this aspect so far. Individuals might be driven
by strong identities, and their actions might be shaped by their commitment to this
identity (Alvesson et al. 2008; George and Qian 2010, Weaver 2006). In other
words, a positive influence on the behavior of the controlled persons is expected if
the audits improve the perception of the living and working conditions of members.
Accordingly, our focus on implementation and additional services complements the
field of management control with other important aspects.
The multidimensionality of control systems stands in stark contrast to current
developments in the governance discourse. Examining theory and practice leaves no
doubt that one type of control currently dominates in controlling the behavior of
managers and employees. Output control procedures constitute the foundation for
performance assessments and incentive schemes, and have become increasingly
popular during the last decades. There is even a proliferation beyond the corporate
field extending to public administration (see the literature on ‘‘New Public
Management’’) as well as to the nonprofit sector (Dart 2004; Perry et al. 2009; Frey
et al. 2013). The dominant paradigm behind these developments is the homo
oeconomicus, which assumes fully rational and self-interested actors. Thus, external
incentives are the best way to direct the members of an organization efficiently
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Murphy 1990).
While stricter regulation and rigorous standards are discussed on a governmental
level, (Brenner and Schwalbach 2009; Kirkpatrick 2009; Snider 2009), companies
focus on improved output control, for instance, adjusting remuneration systems to
focus on the long run (Feinberg 2011; Hausmann and Bechtold-Orth 2010).
However, history shows that the exclusive use of output measures may be
ineffective in successfully addressing governance problems (Grant 2003; Rost and
Osterloh 2009) and is likely to yield unintended effects (Keevers et al. 2011).
2.2 Audits in the religious orders: visitations
Very few contributions deal with the intersection between governance, control
mechanisms and religious orders. In a seminal paper, Kieser (1987: p. 103) analyzes
religious orders as the ‘‘first deliberately designed organization in the Occident.’’
They became wealthy through their rational organization of labor (e.g., the division
of labor) and their work morale. This resulting wealth was an important reason why
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orders developed sophisticated control systems. McGrath (2007) investigated
knowledge management in monastic communities of the medieval Irish Celtic
church, which depended strongly on governance structures. Further, Inauen et al.
(2010a, b) and Rost et al. (2010) comprehensively studied the Benedictines’
governance structures, which are considered an essential factor in the longevity of
these organizations. The aforementioned authors depict mainly the modes of action
of the internal control mechanisms such as careful selection and socialization of
novices or participation rights of the members. However, internal control is not
sufficient if the subsidiaries’ members get together to circumvent regulations. Thus,
the heads of religious orders and the church are interested in monitoring the local
communities from the outside. One important pillar in the monastic governance
system to counter such aberrations are the visitations (Mu¨ller 2003), which are
carried out by the umbrella organizations of the religious orders. In examining the
monastic visitation procedures, we place them in a context with multiple control
systems and the recent child abuse scandals. In the following section the visitations
are extensively described.
The term ‘‘visitation’’ harks back to the Latin word visitatio, which stands for an
inspection or visit, but also can bear the meaning of affliction or punishment (Frieb
2006). The formalized visit in order to audit organizations is widely applied in
Christian churches. We limit our analysis by concentrating on the visitations in
religious orders of the Roman Catholic Church. The importance of the instrument is
illustrated in Roman Catholic canon law, where visitations have become an
institutionalized term and are described as an inherent requirement for all religious
orders [Codex Iuris Canonici (CIC) 1983, par. 628]. The visitation’s concrete
implementation is regulated in detail in the internal law of the various religious
orders and their communities. In the following, we introduce the purpose and
procedures of this little-known concept.
A look into the literature and internal law, as well as interviews with monastic
experts from different categories of orders,2 provides a better understanding of the
monastic visitations. One purpose of the visitation is the immediate on-site
inspection of the religious life in order to reveal and correct shortcomings
(Hirnsperger 2001; Mu¨ller 2003). On the one hand, the spiritual conditions and life
of religious members are monitored; on the other hand, legal relationships, land
tenure and the financial state—that is, the economic part of the religious
organizations—are addressed. Betz et al. (2005) define the twofold orientation on
spiritual and economic condition as being the core function of the visitation.
However, as the constitutions disclose, the range of tasks is more comprehensive
today. The constitutions of the Benedictine Congregation of Beuron (Beuroner
Benediktinerkongregation 2003, par. 244) extensively describe the general targets a
visitation usually has, not only in the Benedictine Order but in all religious orders
we examined, as ‘‘The purpose of the monastic visitations is to make the delegate
familiar with the situation in the particular monasteries, to strengthen abbot and
convent in their enthusiasm for monastic life, to examine the adherence of general
ecclesiastical regulations, rule of the order, law of the congregation [the umbrella
2 See the Acknowledgements section for detailed information.
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organization of the Benedictines] and traditions of the community, to intervene
against observed misbehavior, to encourage the renewal of authorities deemed
necessary and to monitor the economic situation of the monastery.’’ Depending on
the community and order, the goals are weighted differently.
The visitations are accomplished by the umbrella organizations of a religious
order, usually by the leadership of a province. The visitors normally have broad
authority and are committed through a personally addressed obligation from the
order’s leadership. Interview information and internal law reveal that the procedure
of the visitations intended to achieve these objectives is more or less similar in every
religious order. In some communities it is roughly outlined in the internal statutes
(Franciscans 2007; Premonstratensians 1997). A monastic visitation is always
announced, possibly with an antecedent questionnaire, which gives the members the
opportunity to reflect and to prepare—and maybe to conceal. A church service
opens the procedure, followed by extensive conversations between the visitors and
the community’s leader, and then with every single member. The next step is the
economic assessment of the organization. Religious organizations increasingly draw
on external expertise (auditing services), but this does not discharge the visitors
from liability (Meier 2006). The audit experts gather all the information to prepare
the visitation report. The results and recommendations are first discussed with the
leader and then presented to, and negotiated in, the plenum where changes are
initiated. The visitation ends with a common service. Interestingly, the monitoring
of the realization of the measures often devolves to the community’s number two,
for instance, the prior. Some communities hold an assembly on the subjects of the
visitation: A few months after the inspection, a delegation reviews the progress and
implementation measures.
Despite the common fundamental structures of monastic auditing, visitations
show varied characteristics that allow a comparison of the different visitation
systems. Examples are the frequency of the inspection, the number of visiting
persons, the visitor’s opportunities to influence and the subject of control. In more
federalist orders such as the Benedictines, Cistercians or Premonstratensians,
visitations are less frequent—ranging from every year to every 6 years—but come
with more personnel, normally two or three visitors. The visitation’s duration
depends on the community’s size and is more or less similar in the various orders. In
a medium-size community of about a dozen members, the procedure lasts about
three to 7 days. However, enforcing the measures and subsequent improvement
processes can take months or even years. The visitors have some discretion in the
execution of the audits. More or less attention can be paid to the different items on
the agenda. We find it striking that visitations in many religious orders are quite
similar, but the elements, such as the objects of control, differ fundamentally. While
we have communities where visitors are interested only in spiritual and community
life (control the books may often be outsourced), others concentrate mainly on the
business aspects or on problems such as recruiting and financing (often caused by
the loss of members). In many communities, the visitors set thematic priorities. For
instance, a rule from the constitutions or a Bible verse can be the leitmotif of the
visit. Further, visitations are completed with additional tasks regarding specific
traditions and the purposes of the particular orders. For example, for those members
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who do not live in the same monastery for a lifetime—such as the Franciscans, who
have to change their residence every 9 years at a minimum—the information gained
from the inspections provides the foundation for any moves. The report discusses
how members can be appointed to the most suitable tasks in the best possible place.
In Managerial Control Theory, an adequate theoretical basis is found to meet the
specific requirements of monastic governance. In the following sections, we derive
hypotheses covering the types of control applied in the visitations. Different
characteristics of the religious orders should affect the control system used. Then,
we investigate the effectiveness of the control system in cases of sexual abuse and
internal rule violations.
3 Hypotheses development
In order to contribute to the discourse on multiple control systems, we investigate
the monastic audit system. For the analysis, we rely on ideas originating in
Managerial Control Theory. The theory highlights the link between control systems
design and the organization’s task environment (Ouchi 1977, 1979; Turner and
Makhija 2006; Cardinal 2001; Kirsch 1996). Task environment is defined on two
dimensions. One is ‘‘knowledge of measurability and attributability of outputs;’’ the
other is ‘‘knowledge of cause-effect relations’’ (Thompson 1967), or worded
differently, ‘‘knowledge of the transformation process’’ (Ouchi 1977).
Figure 1 illustrates the paper’s theoretical foundation and the research questions.
On the left-hand side, Ouchi’s four types of control (1977, 1979) are the starting
positions for our analysis. Four mechanisms are delineated that control and steer the
behavior of the managers and employees: input, output, process and clan controls.
We investigate which types of control are applied in the monastic visitations and
analyze their impact on misconduct, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of
process and clan controls. In incorporating the implementation of visitations and
additional services, we develop Managerial Control Theory in an important
direction. We expect an indirect impact on misconduct if the procedures are fair and
meaningful and if they simultaneously strengthen the identity of the religious
members.
3.1 Control forms
Output control is most appropriate when process or cause-effect relations are
difficult to specify, but the outputs are easy to measure (Eisenhardt 1985). In
contrast, the preconditions of process control include evaluators that have the
appropriate knowledge of the process of transforming inputs into outputs. Neither
output control nor process control work sufficiently well when measurability and
accountability of outputs is not given and the external controllers’ knowledge of the
transformation process are limited. Clan or input control is proposed as a solution.
Clan control can be described as an assessment of individuals or groups as to
whether they follow internalized norms, procedures, professional standards and
rituals (Grant 2011; Ouchi 1977). For instance, senior colleagues functioning as role
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models for younger coworkers and exhibiting the desired behavior induce the
internalization of norms and values. A possible alternative to clan control in this
quadrant (see Fig. 1) is input control, which works in a different way. With careful
selection, trustworthy people are chosen; and with socialization processes, the
desired behavior of these members is further emphasized. The concept was extended
by Sitkin et al. (2010) and Cardinal et al. (2004) who highlight shifts in the use of
different types of control in a longitudinal analysis. Similarly, in addition to
organizational structure, Kirsch et al. (2010) emphasize the importance of social
capital as a precondition for an efficient clan control. Clan control is most effective
if project managers and team members trust and respect one other, apply shared
mental models and exchange information frequently.3
The visitation is a very stable and highly esteemed auditing system developed in
the religious orders. According to Managerial Control Theory, the type of control
depends on the ability to measure outputs and the knowledge of the transformation
process. Taking this into account, we expect specific characteristics of control to
gain acceptance in these communities over the centuries. Religious orders represent
a paradigm for an organization in which the performance of the individual members
is hard to quantify and is not easily assignable (here we see some parallels, for
instance, to the knowledge-intensive work of managers) (Frost et al. 2010). Often,
there is a lack of precise and quantifiable outcomes (Ehrmann et al. 2013). It is
impossible to evaluate the effects of sincere prayer or to answer the question of how
many of the padres, sisters and brothers go to heaven. Even the effects of social
tasks such as helping people in need, youth work or missionary work are very hard
to capture. This situation implies that the achievement and control of objectives is
only possible, to a limited extent, with output criteria. To enable an appraisal, for
example, of spiritual performance, we expect religious orders to draw on alternative
types of control. Managerial Control Theory offers input, process and clan controls
as a solution. It is imaginable that all three types of control are part of the visitation
3 Closely related to the framework of Ouchi (1979) is the levers of control model from Simons (1990,
1995, 2000). This equally comprehensive model shows many intersections and points of contact. For
instance, diagnostic control shares many similarities with output control; whereas, belief systems build a
bridge to clan control.
Types of control Effect
Knowledge of the transformation process
Control
Strengthened adherence   
to the rules
Implementation of Control
Additional services
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 to
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 o
ut
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ts
Low
High
Perfect                 Imperfect
Process control Clan control or 
input control
Process control 
or output 
control
Output control
Reduced misbehavior / 
misconduct
No crowding out of motivation
Reinforcing faith and identity
Fig. 1 Visitations in religious orders: basic framework. Source Four field matrix adapted from Ouchi
(1977, 1979)
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procedures. Are the right novices selected and are they carefully socialized into
monastic life (input control)? Do the members adhere to traditions and rites; do
prayers start punctually and in an attentive atmosphere (process control)? Does the
community encourage the observance of rules and constitutions, and is misbehavior
sanctioned by peers (clan control)?
In contrast, for the evaluation of the economic situation, a verification of output-
performance is possible to some degree. As do other nonprofit organizations,
religious orders have to be self-supporting. Earnings arise from work in the parishes,
owner enterprises, lease of land, donations and many other undertakings. Here an
output-performance comparison makes some sense, especially because the religious
communities operate in manageable businesses, where this specific type of control is
perfectly possible (Ouchi 1977, 1979). We expect output control where the
management of the monastic properties is dominant, that is, where outcomes are
easily measurable and assignable. Referring to Managerial Control Theory, we
expect the religious communities to make use of the different kinds of control, that
is, of multiple control systems.
However, we do not suggest that the religious communities weight the different
types of control equally. The choice of control depends on the specific
characteristics of the goods produced. Ehrmann et al. (2013: p. 31) define broadly
two distinct sets of goods in religious orders: ‘‘search/experience goods, that is,
goods whose features and characteristics are either easily evaluated before purchase
or can be ascertained upon consumption, and credence goods, that is, goods whose
utility impact is difficult or impossible to ascertain. The first set, for example,
includes such products as beer, herbs, farming, mission, or solidarity with the poor.
The quality of these products can be (more) easily evaluated and priced. The second
set includes salvation goods like contemplation, or prayers.’’ One could expect that
communities with a strongly contemplative orientation in which prayer, meditation
or spiritual exercises are more important (and cannot be assessed by means of
outcomes) than are purposes in economy, social affairs, education or mission, show
a greater emphasis on process and clan controls. We formulate the first hypothesis:
H1 Communities that primarily focus on prayer and contemplation attach greater
weight to process- and clan control in the visitations than do communities that
pursue targets in ‘‘the outside world.’’
Further, we suggest that specific traditions have an impact on the configuration of
control procedures. With their specific history, spirituality or purpose, religious
orders have different cultural practices and priorities.
3.2 Effectiveness
In addition to the arrangement of the control types, we examine whether and when
visitations are effective. We examine their relation to sexual abuse cases and rule
violations. According to the data available, an evaluation of monastic control
systems’ effectiveness proves difficult. Due to privacy protection, it is impossible to
view visitation protocols and to assess behavioral change, even if members are long
deceased. However, the variance in the current visitation systems of the religious
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orders allows an evaluation of the different types of control. In particular, we are
interested in the question of whether a focus on process and clan controls reveals a
significant effect on the behavior of the padres and brothers, illustrating that a
control of values and principles can be successful in audit procedures. Utilizing a
quantitative, comparative approach between the communities, it is possible to
investigate whether specific characteristics of the monastic audits are linked to the
number of incidents. We investigate the impact of visitations on sexual abuse cases
and rule violations.
H2a Communities whose visitation procedures rely heavily on process- and clan
control to examine the behavior of their members show a lower likelihood for sexual
abuse cases.
H2b Communities whose visitation procedures rely heavily on process- and clan
control to examine the behavior of their members show a lower likelihood for
violations of the basic rules than do communities whose visitation procedures rely
heavily on output control.
Further, characteristics of visitations and religious orders suggest they have an
impact on sexual misconduct and rule violation. On the visitations side, one would
expect a correlation between the frequency of the audit procedures and misconduct
in a religious community. Large differences exist. For instance, on average,
Benedictines conduct visitations every 5.3 years, Franciscans 3.5 years, Capuchins
2.4 years, Dominicans 3.2 years, Jesuits 1.2 years and Divine Word Missionaries
3.6 years. We analyze the following set of hypotheses:
H3a The higher the frequency of visitations, the less likely are sexual abuse cases.
H3b The higher the frequency of visitations, the less likely are violations of the
basic rules.
In the theoretical section of this paper we emphasize the importance of an
appropriate implementation of the procedures in order to prevent a crowding out of
motivation. The data record does not allow for a quantitative analysis of these
issues. We therefore rely on interviews and constitutions to decide which aspects the
religious leaders pay attention to when implementing their controls. Finally, an
improvement of the controls is expected if they are combined with additional
services that support identity and commitment to the organization. We investigate
the impact of visitation procedures where identity development is fostered. From
this we formulate the last set of hypotheses.
H4a Communities whose visitation procedures attach importance to identity
development show a lower probability for sexual abuse cases than do communities
whose visitation procedures do not.
H4b Communities whose visitation procedures attach importance to identity
development show a lower probability for violations of the basic rules than do
communities whose visitation procedures do not.
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4 Methodology
4.1 Procedure and sample
The data for this analysis is based on a unique survey of Catholic religious orders in
Austria, Germany and Switzerland that was carried out between November 2009
and April 2010. The survey was sent to 216 local communities; and 106 usable
questionnaires were returned, of which 10 had to be excluded due to missing data on
some of the variables. All major religious orders participated with a response rate of
at least 40 %. Table 1 shows the breakdown of the orders in our sample.
It was not possible to include the total population of the communities in the
German-speaking area. We therefore use two main criteria for choosing orders and
local religious communities: the category and the size of an order. The category
Table 1 Sample of religious orders
Category Name of the religious order No. of surveys received
Monastic orders Benedictines 10
Cistercians 5
Carthusiansc 1
Canons regular Augustinian Canons 7
Premonstratensians 6
Mendicant orders Dominicans 8
Capuchins 11
Franciscans 17
Carmelitesc 1
Clerks regulara Jesuits/Society of Jesus 11
Camillians 2
Congregationsb Redemptorists 5
Divine Word Missionaries 8
Missionary Oblates of Mary Immaculate 4
White Fathers 4
Salvatorians 4
Single communitiesc 2
Total 106
The scale of the religious orders in the German-speaking area was elicited via the websites of the
communities (number of communities). Rate of Return: Benedictines 40 %, Cistercians 45 %, Augus-
tinian Canons 45 %, Premonstratensians 75 %, Dominicans 62 %, Capuchins 65 %, Franciscans 68 %,
Jesuits/Society of Jesus 69 %, Redemptorists 45 %, Divine Word Missionaries 62 %, Missionary Oblates
of Mary Immaculate 67 %, White Fathers 57 %, Salvatorians 57 %. A nonresponse bias on the level of
religious orders does not appear
a The Jesuits have, by far, the largest size and impact in this category. Besides the Society of Jesus, only a
few very small communities exist in the German-speaking area. We have chosen the Camillians as a
second organization
b In the category of Congregations, with several dozen religious orders, the proportions are not obvious
c Some single communities exemplary of a certain category of religious order are included as well
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depends on the historical background of the orders and comprises monastic orders,
canons regular, mendicant orders, clerks regular and congregations (Schwaiger and
Heim 2008). Although we inquired into the concrete, contemporaneous practices of
the communities, these archetypes were important in choosing a balanced selection
of religious orders. Our second criterion is the size of orders in the German-speaking
area. From every category, at least two of the largest orders—according to the
number of houses of a religious order—are represented in the sample. Additionally,
we targeted organizations in Germany (50 communities), Austria (29), and
Switzerland (27), due to the particular histories of and conditions within these
countries. Seventy-three percent of the surveys were filled out by leaders, and
nineteen percent by officials from local communities (executives in finance or
education). Ninety percent of the responders possess a high level of education.
Accordingly, we can assume that the participants possess a requisite knowledge of
good governance. All respondents to our survey were male.
4.2 Measures
The following sections outline the variables used for the subsequent quantitative analysis.
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the variable coding and display means and the standard
deviations of dependent and independent variables. Correlations are listed in ‘‘Appendix’’.
Before crafting the questionnaire we conducted expert interviews to better
understand what measures should be included in the survey and to increase content
validity of the survey items. In order to gain in-depth information on the visitations,
we talked to seven monastic leaders (see ‘‘Acknowledgements’’ section for more
information). These padres and brothers supervised the project and added to a
correct understanding of the monastic structures and connections.
In addition to the subjective survey statements, objective sources are included in
the regression analysis. Web and media research delivered current data on
misconduct in the religious communities, as well as information concerning a
religious community’s involvement in child and youth work. In order to get a
comprehensive picture, we scrutinized the literature on visitations and thoroughly
reviewed the constitutions of the different religious orders.
4.2.1 Dependent variables
To analyze the effectiveness of process- and clan control we rely on two dependent
variables: sexual abuse cases and internal rule violations. In the first set of analyses
Table 2 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics of dependent variables
Variable Description Mean SD
Occurrence of sexual abuse
case
Dummy variable equal to 1 if cases of sexual abuse were
reported in reference to one of the orders in the sample
0.14 0.34
Occurrence of internal rule
violation or abuse case
Dummy variable equal to 1 if rule violation or abuse case
were reported on the survey
0.25 0.44
N 96
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we investigate the number of sexual abuse cases associated with each order. The
sexual abuse cases were made public in 2010 in the German-speaking area and
resulted in a meticulous review of suspect organizations. The monastic institutions
were under general suspicion and were regarded with great skepticism. It seems
unlikely that the religious organizations are able to conceal serious cases anymore.
We reviewed media reports about sexual abuse cases. The reported cases reveal
substantial scope in the number of victims and perpetrators. It must be assumed that
many community members knew about the problems, but suppressed or concealed
the truth. Such behavior stands in stark contrast to the religious orders’ constitutions
and denotes a serious failure of a community. We excluded cases of isolated
misconduct or crimes by a lone offender. Based on this information a binary
dependent variable taking the value of 1 if an abuse case was reported and zero
otherwise was created.
In the second set of analyses, we investigate internal rule violations of the orders.
We asked the leaders of each order to tell us about acute problems in their
communities (excluding financial and recruiting issues, which are common in many
organizations) and to identify the most recent issue. Leaders reported about 20 cases
that indicate a severe rule violation. Examples include the following: breaking
vows, agitation, waste of assets and serious indiscretions. From this information we
were able to create a variable that indicates internal rule violations. Considered
jointly, the sexual abuse cases and the rule violations allow us to examine whether
the characteristics of the visitations increase the probability for misconduct in the
forms of sexual abuse and internal rule violations. Where the visitations focus on the
control of principles and spiritual life, we expect fewer of these problems. Thus, we
combined the information on abuse cases with the information on internal rule
Table 3 Variable definitions and descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Description Mean SD
Focus on process and
clan control
Dummy variable equal to 1 if focus is on process and clan
control (1), or 0 if focus is on Output control
0.51 0.50
Frequency Frequency of visitation as number of visitations per year 3.27 1.43
Supportive Dummy variable equal to 1 if visitation is perceived as
supporting, 0 otherwise
0.29 0.46
Canons regular Dummy variable equal to 1 if order is ‘‘canons regular’’ 0.10 0.31
Monastic Dummy variable equal to 1 if ‘‘monastic order’’ 0.13 0.33
Mendicant Dummy variable equal to 1 if ‘‘mendicant order’’ 0.39 0.49
Congregation Dummy variable equal to 1 if ‘‘congregation’’ 0.24 0.43
Youth Dummy variable equal to 1 if members of the order are active in
youth or child development, 0 otherwise
0.41 0.49
Germany Dummy variable equal to 1 if order is located in Germany 0.48 0.50
Austria Dummy variable equal to 1 if order is located in Austria 0.26 0.44
Size Number of members 18.76 21.03
Age Mean age of community members 60.27 9.09
N 96
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violations and created a dependent variable that takes the value of 1 if a rule
violation or abuse case was reported and zero otherwise.
4.2.2 Independent variables
The main independent variables are the type of control, frequency of visitations and
supportive nature of visitations (that is, identity strengthening in the visitation
procedures). These variables emerged as important based on the theoretical
foundations presented in the literature review sections of this paper and as a result of
the preliminary interviews with monastic experts. Therefore, we included those
variables in the survey. Additionally, we controlled for the type of order, national
origin of the order, whether the order’s members are active in child and youth
development, size of the order and age of the order’s members. The variables are
explained in further detail below.
4.2.2.1 Type of control A set of survey items aimed at identifying the different
types of controls that illustrate the focus of the communities. We asked the monastic
leaders: ‘‘Which importance do you ascribe to the visitations regarding the control
of finances and economic activity, the control of rules and spiritual life?’’ The items
depict different types of control; whereas the control of finances points to the
monitoring of books and key figures—that is, typical output-control procedures,
control of rules and spiritual life happen predominantly through process or clan
controls (output control is not possible here). All items used 5-point Likert scales.
Ultimately, we split the sample into two groups and created a dummy variable for
process and clan controls.
4.2.2.2 Frequency of visitations The frequency of visitations was measured as the
number of visitations per year. Broad variance exists between the different religious
orders as related to the audit frequency. The survey item asked monastic leaders
how often (in years) their communities are visited.
4.2.2.3 Supportive nature of visitation One item asked the monastic leaders to
describe additional tasks of the visitations. Based on this qualitative information, we
created a dummy variable reflecting which communities attach great importance to
‘‘identity strengthening’’ through the visitation procedures (Table 7). The variable
takes the value of 1 if the visitation was considered as supporting the identity
development of the order and zero otherwise.
4.2.2.4 Type of order We used dummy variables to control for the archetypes of
orders represented in our sample (clerks regular, canons regular, monastic orders,
mendicant orders and congregations). Clerks regular is the reference category.
4.2.2.5 Youth development This variable is a dummy variable that captures
whether members of the order are active in child or youth development (1 if active
in youth development and zero otherwise). Regarding the investigation of sexual
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abuse cases, an emphasis on youth development represents a crucial variable. The
internet was helpful in searching for information about whether a community’s
priorities include child and youth work in schools, parishes and youth centers.
4.2.2.6 Origin We used a set of dummy variables to control for the national origin
of the order represented in our sample. The sample comprises orders from Germany,
Austria and Switzerland. Switzerland is the reference category. By controlling for
countries, we account for differences in legislation and environments.
4.2.2.7 Size of order We controlled for the size of the order by asking the
respondent for the number of members that the order currently has.
4.2.2.8 Age The age variable captures the average age in years of the respective
community members.
Both size of the order and the age variable take the composition of the
communities into account. For instance, we can assume that in smaller communities
fewer and different problems occur, just as in the case of communities with a
different age structure among members.
4.2.2.9 Economic and contemplative orientation of a religious community Eco-
nomic orientation is illustrated with the items ‘‘Owner enterprises as the most
important source of funding: Yes/No’’ and ‘‘The name of our community is a brand
name as well.’’ Contemplative orientation is illustrated with the items ‘‘How distinct
is the contemplative orientation of your local community?’’ and ‘‘Work is a spiritual
experience’’. The items are measured on 5-point Likert scales. This variable was
used to assess hypothesis 1.
4.2.3 Analyses
We use a comparison of means to investigate hypothesis 1. For all remaining
hypotheses (H2a–H4b) we use logistic regression analysis to investigate which
variables are associated with an increased or decreased probability of abuse cases
and rule violations. In both cases the dependent variable is binary (sexual abuse;
abuse and internal rule violations) and consequently logistic regression is the
appropriate choice. Alternatives are probit or tobit models. Probit models have
advantages when modeling latent variables. However, in our case variables (abuse,
rule violations) are observable. Tobit models are more appropriate for truncated
variables, and therefore were not an option in our case. Considering these aspects
jointly led us to believe that logit models are a good choice for our purposes.
Nonetheless, we computed the Anderson–Darling normality test which rejects the
normality assumption. This again ruled out the probit regression and gave us
another good reason for using logistic regression which is not dependent on normal
distributions. For ease of interpretation the regression output tables display odds
ratios instead of logits.
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5 Results
5.1 Types of control applied in the visitation procedures
The first part of the empirical results deals with the different types of control. Do the
visitations encompass the different control forms specified in Managerial Control
Theory (input, process-, output- and clan control)? (See Fig. 1).
According to the monastic leaders, output control and ex post evaluation hold a
special position in most of the communities. Corresponding to the theory, they are
applied mainly for the control of economic performance where comparing budget
figures with actual figures is barely a problem. Fundamental purposes, such as to
‘‘search for God’’ (Benedictines) or to ‘‘live the gospel in compassion, penance and
preaching’’ (Franciscans) (Engelbert 2009; Holtz 2001) are evaluated in another way.
Here, input-, process- and clan control come into consideration. Selection and
socialization (that is, input control) are central elements of monastic governance, but
in the context of the visitation, they play a minor part. More relevant for the monastic
audit are process and clan controls. During interviews with monastic leaders, it
became apparent that process and clan controls in the visitations are closely related
and a separation is not possible. The main purpose of the visitations is to get an idea
of the moral and spiritual situation of a community. First, the auditors actively
participate in the religious life of the community during the visits. Second, and even
more important, extensive one-on-one conversations with the religious members take
place. Typical questions that address the members’ behavior refer to the problems
and successes in monastic life and the relationships within the community. In the
visitation statutes of the Franciscans Art. 26 (2007) it is written: ‘‘He [the visitor]
should, in particular, assess how the Friars: (1) participate in fraternal life…; (2)
cultivate the spirit of prayer and devotion; (3) behave as minors and as workers for
justice and peace among themselves; (4) work faithfully and devotedly; (5) live a life
of poverty; (6) promote the Franciscan charism.’’ In the talks, visitors try to sense if
the members are meeting values and principles and, where this is not the case, try to
induce behavioral changes. Visitors, padres and brothers attempt to improve the
situation with praise and criticism, with discussions in private and among the group,
and with stricter measures where necessary. Whereas active participation and the
questioning by the visitors refer mainly to processes, clan control takes place in the
discussions and in implementing the decisions.
We investigate the orientation of a community in respect to the control system
employed. First, linearity tests indicate that generally higher levels of process and
clan controls are associated with higher levels of contemplation (F = 6.26;
p \ 0.05) and higher levels of experiencing work as a spiritual experience
(F = 4.17; p \ 0.05). Additionally, all deviations from linearity are not significant.
In contrast, orders that run their own businesses rely more strongly on output
control. Running a business serves as a proxy for economic orientation. The t test
indicates that orders running a business attach a higher importance to output control
(|t| = 2.07; p \ 0.05) than do the remaining organizations. In addition, orders using
their names as brands are associated with higher output control (F = 2.82; p \ 0.1).
Again all deviations from linearity are not significant.
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In the second step, we break the analysis down to the different archetypes of
religious orders. The results of the comparison of means are displayed in Table 4.
The numbers illustrate that the visitation systems differ according to a community’s
affiliation. Monastic orders attach significantly more weight to the control of finance
and economy than other communities do. This can be partly explained by the
business activities of these orders. Many of them have associated enterprises (from
breweries to publishers to commercial real estate) and, thus, financial monitoring is
more imperative. Tendencies in the mendicant (Capuchin, Dominican, Franciscans)
and clerks regular orders (Jesuits) are difficult to interpret. For example, we find that
mendicants attach significantly less importance to process and clan controls
compared to the rest of the sample. The opposite is the case for clerks regular. The
latter give significantly more importance to process and clan controls. However, the
differences in priorities are obvious. The case suggests that audit procedures depend
on the customs and traditions of an organization. Visitations reflect the control
culture: output-, process-, and clan control are weighted differently when auditing
the various communities.
To summarize, visitations constitute a comprehensive control tool that considers
measurability of outputs and knowledge of the transformation process. Overall,
these results support hypothesis 1 and show that contemplative organizations, with
their hardly measurable outputs, rely more on process and clan controls in the audit
procedure; whereas, economically orientated orders rely on output control to a
stronger extent. Further, monastic traditions and purposes influence the concrete
configuration of the audits.
5.2 Effectiveness of the visitations
Fourteen communities that completed our survey a few months before the scandals
went public in 2010 have been severely affected by those incidents. The results of
Table 4 Types of control: comparison of means
Religious order Process and clan control Output control
N |T| Sig. N |T| Sig.
Canons regular 10 0.298 0.766 10 0.234 0.815
Monastic Orders 12 0.921 0.359 12 2.739 0.007***
Mendicants 37 2.20 0.029* 37 1.179 0.241
Congregations 23 0.248 0.804 23 0.651 0.516
Clerks regular 13 1.941 0.054 13 0.734 0.46
N total 95 95
Factors that influence the visitations types of control: economic orientation, contemplative orientation
Comparison of means. Each order is tested against the remainder of the sample
To describe the different foci of the religious orders, we outline the deviation from the mean of all
religious orders in the sample. Example: For the 12 monastic orders in the sample, output control is
significantly more important (t = 2.7, p \ 0.01) than for the average community
*** p \ 0.001; ** p \ 0.01; * p \ 0.05;  p \ 0.10
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our logistic regression analyses are shown in Tables 5 and 6. Table 5 displays
results for the analysis of sexual abuse cases; whereas, Table 6 presents the results
for the analysis of abuse and internal rule violations. Both tables display odds ratios
for ease of interpretation. An odds ratio larger than 1 indicates a higher probability
of abuse and rule violations; whereas, an odds ratio below one indicates a lower
probability of such events. We estimate five different models for each dependent
variable.
Table 5 Logistic regression on sexual abuse cases
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable Abuse Abuse Abuse Abuse Abuse
Independent variables (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio)
Focus on process and
clan control
0.155** 0.0799** 0.0316*
(0.126) (0.101) (0.0594)
Frequency 1.153 2.654* 3.443*
(0.276) (1.531) (2.541)
Identity development 0.433 0.255 0.106*
(0.359) (0.302) (0.142)
Canons regular 0.166 0.00975 0.78 0.000559*
(0.299) (0.0286) (1.153) (0.00226)
Monastic 1.406 0.398 10.42 0.00839
(2.732) (0.94) (16.92) (0.0311)
Mendicant 0.0387** 0.0130** 0.139* 0.00120**
(0.0551) (0.024) (0.164) (0.00362)
Congregations 0.0182** 0.0109** 0.0558** 0.00108**
(0.0294) (0.0194) (0.0752) (0.00289)
Youth 4.626* 8.837** 4.900* 7.638*
(4.049) (8.91) (4.153) (8.164)
Germany 40.84* 142.1** 104.7** 65.07*
(83.96) (320) (216.1) (156.1)
Austria 9.382 20.65 12.59 20.32
(16.28) (38.34) (21.15) (40.87)
Size 1.022 1.023 1.018 1.024
(0.0266) (0.0278) (0.0247) (0.0272)
Age 1.07 1.087 1.057 1.074
(0.0599) (0.0647) (0.0587) (0.0695)
Constant 0.217 0.000522 1.89e-06** 0.000106** 0.000115
(0.208) (0.0024) (0.0000101) (0.000482) (0.000656)
N 96 96 96 96 96
McFadden R2 0.129 0.474 0.437 0.416 0.556
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p \ 0.01; ** p \ 0.05; * p \ 0.1
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5.2.1 Estimation strategy and Robustness
The first four models focus on the main variables of interest: type of control,
frequency of visitations and supportive identity development. The final model
(models 5 and 10) estimates the full set of variables. Presenting several models for
each case serves as an additional robustness check. We further checked for
multicollinearity by calculating variance inflation factors (VIF). For all models the
VIF are within normal limits. The mean VIF for the full model is 2.07 and the
Table 6 Logistic regression on internal rule violations
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Dependent variable Rule
violation
Rule
violation
Rule
violation
Rule
violation
Rule
violation
Independent variables (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio) (odds ratio)
Focus on process and clan
control
0.234*** 0.167** 0.116***
(0.13) (0.118) (0.0928)
Frequency 1.072 1.158 1.147
(0.207) (0.418) (0.583)
Identity development 0.160** 0.0836** 0.0532**
(0.128) (0.0881) (0.0609)
Canons regular 0.607 0.735 1.129 0.298
(0.713) (1.223) (1.282) (0.68)
Monastic 1.777 3.332 6.106 1.088
(2.315) (5.521) (7.854) (2.629)
Mendicant 0.161* 0.241 0.35 0.0999
(0.152) (0.252) (0.326) (0.149)
Congregations 0.273 0.411 0.417 0.149
(0.266) (0.408) (0.395) (0.198)
Youth 3.281* 3.377** 3.671** 4.174*
(2.1) (2.039) (2.397) (3.097)
Germany 11.04** 16.34** 23.74** 20.15**
(13.43) (18.89) (30.26) (28.77)
Austria 21.12** 21.54*** 30.28*** 37.41**
(25.99) (24.92) (38.94) (53.55)
Size 1.025 1.02 1.018 1.022
(0.0166) (0.0157) (0.0147) (0.0165)
Age 1.066 1.066 1.056 1.075
(0.0457) (0.0435) (0.0452) (0.0547)
Constant 0.695 0.00130** 0.000231*** 0.000583** 0.000877*
(0.536) (0.00421) (0.000734) (0.00188) (0.00339)
N 96 96 96 96 96
McFadden R2 0.152 0.347 0.279 0.357 0.445
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p \ 0.01; ** p \ 0.05; * p \ 0.1
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largest single VIF is 3.28. Hence, we have no reason to believe multicollinearity is a
problem in our analyses. With the one exception of model 3, no major problem was
noted according to the results of the Hosmer–Lemeshow test. Also, pseudo R-square
values fall into acceptable ranges. Additionally, the linktest specification check did
not yield worrying results. Thus, we conclude that, overall, all but one model have a
good fit with the data.
5.2.2 Results for sexual abuse cases
We first consider the impact on sexual abuse cases. Hypothesis 2a stipulated that
process and clan controls are associated with lower probabilities of sexual abuse
occurring. All models display significant odds ratios lower than one indicating that
these control forms are associated with a lower probability of sexual abuse cases
occurring. Therefore, we accept hypothesis 2a.
Hypothesis 3a linked the likelihood of sexual abuse cases in church organizations
to the frequency of visitations. Model 1 does not indicate any effect in this respect.
However, once we start controlling for a variety of factors, results become stable
and significant. Results indicate that higher values, that is, lower frequency of
visitations, are associated with a higher probability of abuse cases. Therefore, we
have to accept hypothesis 3a.
Hypothesis 4a established that communities whose visitation procedures are
supportive and contribute to the order’s identity development would have a lower
probability of suffering from sexual abuse cases. The full model supports this
hypothesis. The odds ratio is below 1 and significant, indicating that identity
developing visitation procedures are associated with lower probabilities of sexual
abuse cases in religious orders.
Because opportunity invites wrongdoing, it comes as no surprise that an
engagement in child and youth work (item ‘‘youth’’) increases the risk of sexual
misconduct. This variable is positively associated with the probability of sexual
abuse occurring and significant in all models. Overall, we find limited but
nonetheless existing evidence for our hypotheses. However, we have to acknowl-
edge the low significance as all coefficients of the main variables sit on the 10 %
level.
5.2.2.1 Results for abuse and rule violations Now we consider results for the
analysis of rule violations (models 6–10). The estimation strategy is the same as in
the previous section. Diagnostic checks such as the Hosmer–Lemeshow Test did not
raise any concerns and pseudo R-square values fall into acceptable ranges.
Hypothesis 2b linked such misconduct to process and clan controls. Similarly to the
results for abuse cases, we find the results are stable across all models, highly
significant and in the expected direction, that is, process and clan controls are
associated with lower probabilities of misconduct. Thus we accept hypothesis 2b.
Hypothesis 3b stipulated that the frequency of visitations is associated with lower
probabilities of rule violations. We do not find a significant result at this time, and
therefore have to reject hypothesis 3b. Ultimately, hypothesis 4b argued that
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supportive, identity developing visitations are associated with a lower likelihood of
misconduct and rule violations. In this case, the results are clear, significant and
stable across models supporting hypothesis 4b. Again involvement in child and
youth work was significantly associated with an increased probability of rule
violations.
Considering the analysis for abuse cases and rule violations jointly, the most
important result is the validation of hypotheses 2a and 2b highlighting the
importance of control mechanisms other than output control. The focus of control is
moderately significant (OR = 0.03; p \ 0.1) for abuse cases and highly significant
if we add cases of internal rule violation (OR = 0.11, p \ 0.01). Religious
communities that attach more relative weight to process and clan control (the
control of basic principles and spiritual life) than to output control exhibit less
misconduct. Additionally, visitations that support the order’s identity development
appear to be beneficial and help to discipline the order’s members. Consequently,
the emphasis on identity development indicates an alternative way to reduce
wrongdoing.
It is possible to draw some cautious conclusions on the effectiveness of the
visitations today and to clarify hypotheses 2 and 3.4 The outcomes on child abuse
and on rule violations suggest that process and clan controls make an impact on
supervising principles and spiritual life. In the next subsection, we take a qualitative
look at implementation and additional services.
5.3 The crucial role of implementation and identity development
To enable a functioning assessment, the control type is not the only relevant factor.
How the control procedures are implemented and perceived is essential. Such
questions are not considered marginal in the survey. We take a brief look at this
important aspect—in the conversations with the monastic leaders and in reviewing
monastic constitutions.
5.3.1 Trust, secrecy, embeddedness
In the conversations with the monastic leaders, we asked about special requirements
this form of audit involves. In all religious orders, trustworthiness is named as an
inevitable feature if the visitations are to have a full impact. Fundamental respect
and mutual trust between visitor and community member are considered essential
for fruitful cooperation. In many constitutions, we find an admonition to the visitors
to criticize in a fraternal manner in wisdom and love (Beuroner
4 A parallel historical study underscores the impressive significance of the little-known visitations in
Christianity and supports the impression from the quantitative analysis. The existence over centuries—
from late antiquity until today (Peters 2003), and in the religious orders for almost a millennium—of the
visitations, plus their dissemination to all religious orders, dioceses and beyond the Catholic Church
(Schwaiger 2003), point to an extraordinary, successful governance instrument. The history of their
reception illustrates the flexibility and the broad applicability of this religious assessment tool, and reveals
an instrument that heavily influenced the paths of the examined organizations. The focus on output-,
process- and clan control to monitor economic health and spiritual life, a constituting element from the
beginning, proved highly successful.
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Benediktinerkongregation 2003). The controlled padres and brothers must not be
humiliated or put under pressure. In return, the controlled members have a
responsibility and are encouraged to cooperate truthfully with the visitors (CIC
1983: pp. 628). Reliability is further emphasized with the mandatory obligation of
secrecy; a comprehensive privacy protection is guaranteed. The visitor ‘‘is forbidden
to reveal to anyone, in any way, the names of the Friars about whom he has learned
something harmful…’’ (Franciscans 2007 pp. 33). This represents a substantial
difference from common evaluation practices, which, to the contrary, emphasize
transparency. Finally, the procedure is embedded in the spiritual life and tradition of
the community. Padres and brothers pray for successful procedures and agreement,
with services marking the beginning and ending of the visits. Such connections with
personal faith underline the seriousness of the assessment and give some sense to
the monastic audit.
5.3.2 Service orientation
In addition to the implementation, visitations are seen as a service to the community
(Peters 2003). As apparent already in the definitions of the visitation, the control
aspect is but one among others. According to many padres and brothers interviewed,
spiritual strengthening and encouragement of the members is of major importance.
Where legal rules about visitations are available, this objective is also explicitly
mentioned (Salesians 1984). The Premonstratensians’ constitutions read: ‘‘…there-
fore it is the first task of the visitation to strengthen the dynamic spiritual life, to
consolidate legitimate, local customs’’ (Premonstratensians 1997, pp. 227). Again,
the results are confirmed in the survey. The monastic leaders were invited to name
further objectives of the visitations that are carried out in their local communities.
Different tasks are attributed to the monastic auditing beyond control functions.
Table 7 lists these goals according to the number of times each goal is mentioned in
the survey. The most frequently mentioned keywords are better communication,
strengthening of community, and individual members, followed by conversation
about personal mental state, discussion of future perspectives and renewal of the
spiritual life. In their talks, visitors not only focus on monitoring and intervention,
but try to encourage the members and offer assistance. It is striking that more than
half the goals mentioned (printed in bold letters in Table 7) relate to strengthening
and identity development. Visitations in the best-case scenario are a service to the
community, which in turn fosters adequate behavior by deepening identity and faith.
Therefore, spiritual discipline and the observance of canonical and monastic law
should not be emphasized through control alone, but through an improvement of the
living conditions of the religious members.
Monastic auditing indicates that many visitors attach great importance to correct
implementation and complementary services. The elimination of misconduct by
means of controls is not the only intention; the assessment is combined with
different tasks like emphasizing communication or strengthening the communal life
(Peters 2003; Hein 2005).
For a successful auditing, not only the types of control are essential, but also the
kind of implementation has to be considered. Our analysis illustrates that control
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works if the assessed members cooperate and accept the procedures. Additionally,
for the interviewed monastic leaders, support in monastic life and identity
strengthening, central targets of the visitations, have an effect on the (mis-)behavior
of the members. The effect is also reflected in the empirical analysis (H4a and H4b).
6 Discussion and conclusion
The search for good governance is one of the major issues in this decade. How are
managers and employees controlled to reduce misconduct and unethical behavior?
In addition to stricter regulation, financial incentives based on output control are the
favored instrument in steering working employee behavior. The success of output
control procedures continues in the corporate sector (Hilb 2011) and encroaches into
other fields such as public administration or education (Frey et al. 2013, Wragg et al.
2004). However, it is highly controversial as to whether this one-sided direction on
tightened regulation and an enhancement of external controls alone lead to
satisfactory outcomes. With their visitation systems, religious orders offer some
alternative concepts worthy of consideration by other organizational forms. The
analysis of multiple orientations of control (Sect. 5.1) and their effectiveness (Sect.
5.2) in religious orders leads us to the conclusions outlined below.
First, only a control system that is characterized by multiple orientations meets
the requirements of good governance. The religious orders devote themselves to
many different tasks, and the control systems need to take this into account.
Spiritual services such as prayer and meditation are part of their mission. Similarly,
social work, cultural tasks and the production of goods such as books or beer are
interwoven with the mission of religious orders. As a consequence, none of the
examined communities can be reduced to one, two or even three of these tasks. In
such conditions, exclusively output-oriented control systems are not viable.
Following Ouchi (1977, 1979) and his colleagues, the control must fit the task
Table 7 Tasks of the visitations
Which further tasks are accomplished with the visitations? Number of
mentions
Foster communication, encourage meetings 10
Strengthening the community 6
Individual encouragement/strengthening 5
Conversation about personal mental state 5
Future perspectives, goals 5
Renewal of mission/spiritual life 4
Preparatory talks about mutations 3
To open a debate 2
Single indications: preparation of gatherings, supervision in situations of change,
exchange of experience between communities, shelter from work overload, etc.
1
Data in bold letters refer to identity development
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environment of the goods and services. As they differ highly in nature, it is not
sufficient to refer to one of the control archetypes (clan-, process- or output control).
Instead, we need systems that offer a manifold orientation of control. This is
confirmed in the analysis. Communities that neglected the control of spirituality and
community life (that is, process and clan controls) in their visitation procedures and
focused instead on the business routine of their organizations, show a higher
probability of abuse cases and rule violations.
As with the religious communities, most other organizations, including small
ones, provide a wide range of tasks and objectives. We expect similar control
patterns. Across private firms, nonprofit organizations and public administration,
output control has increasingly become the dominant control type. In governance
systems where an exclusive use of output measures is common, the behavior of the
employees is channeled toward fulfilling tasks relevant for their assessment and
compensation (Chava and Purnanandam 2010; Johnson 2011). Individuals act
strategically to reach their goals (Bebchuk and Fried 2005, Holmstro¨m and Milgrom
1991; Jensen 2003; Jensen et al. 2004; Rajan 2010). Behaviors that cannot be easily
monitored, such as organizational citizenship behavior, tend to be ignored (Weibel
2007). A multiple-oriented control system, involving input-, process-, or clan
control, mitigates the potentially negative effects of pure output control. Wrong
incentives are reduced, and the challenges of difficult measurability and perfor-
mance accountability are faced with a more comprehensive basis (Frost et al. 2010).
Process- and clan control shift the focus away from employees who want immediate
gratification and are tempted to violate standards (Johnson et al. 2009). Finally and
probably most importantly, a well-balanced control system takes into account the
firm’s culture and values (Fortado 1994; Simons 1995; 2000) and is able to
influence the behavior of management and employees. Behavior consistent with
group expectations, norms and values will be rewarded; fraudulent behavior will be
sanctioned (Fortado 1994; Osterloh and Frey 2006). It has been shown that belief
and value systems can be powerful levers of control (Rodrigue et al. 2013; Simons
2000). Organizations, in particular nonprofit ones, may benefit from an increased
use of such control systems.
Second, the specific characteristic of monastic visitations is the distinct
coexistence of different types of control in the monastic audits. Performance is
hard to measure in the religious institutions, so alternative types of control that do
not rely on outputs have been developed. What is surprising here is that different
types of control are applied simultaneously in the auditing process. This is
commonly an area of governance normally focused strongly on processes, output
control and ex post evaluations (Merchant and Van der Stede 2012). The visitations
not only help to control the books and the economic situation, but if correctly
applied, they also consider organization culture, that is, the spirit and the discipline
of the monks, and the adherence to principles and traditions. Formal and informal
control mechanisms are considered (Cardinal et al. 2010). Whereas output control
plays a role in the monitoring of economic activities and the financial state of a
community, the control of values and principles through process and clan controls is
equally important. Our analysis substantiates the success of the twofold orientation
of monastic audits, an emphasis differing considerably from auditing processes in
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other organizations. This extension of auditing and monitoring procedures could be
a promising way to achieve better governance in other control systems as well.
Third, the study demonstrates that not only are the different types of control
important but identity development is crucial (Sect. 5.3). In the twentieth century,
the focus in the religious orders’ auditing tended to shift away from a one-sided
orientation on control to favoring a system of support and mutual assistance.
Individual support and identity development go hand in hand with visitation
procedures. A strengthening of community and individual members is expected to
foster a correct attitude and behavior in the padres, sisters and brothers, as in the
case of controls. Additionally, with great care, the religious communities embed the
visitation processes in their daily life and the value system of their organizations to
provide sense and comprehension. Such an approach bringing together control and
support may seem idealistic for some organizations; however, it could be
worthwhile to configure controls in such a way as to prevent feelings of distrust
or marginality. The findings in the religious orders illustrate that controls do not
have to be perceived as being controlling to have effect. Intrinsic values, such as
identification, trust, and integrity, promote a functioning control system (De Charms
1968; Deci and Ryan 1980; Frey 1997; Osterloh and Weibel 2008).
Fourth, we adopt a more general perspective that points beyond internal audit
measures by examining the abuse scandals. The investigation shows that even
organizations whose raison d’eˆtre is compassion are not immune to severe
governance failures. It also appears that the instrument of the visitations was not
sufficient to guarantee correct behavior. Knowing that the following considerations
need some verification, the cases indicate that the coordination with other control
mechanisms was not adequately developed. Instead of dealing with the scandals and
accounting for the past behaviors, the sexual abuse cases were placed under a taboo.
This behavior reveals one of the most severe dangers of internal governance, the
emergence of groupthink (Janis 1972; Tajfel 1981). Monastic communities are life
partnerships that depend on a distinct homogeneity among members (Schmelzer
1979). Strong group cohesion is fostered with internal control mechanisms—for
instance, with a rigorous socialization of the novices—and the development of a
strong corporate identity. Groupthink can be one consequence leading to the wrong
kind of solidarity between members or into a culture of concealment. Additionally,
because of a specific Catholic trait of keeping up the reputation of the ‘‘Holy
Church’’ at all costs, high dignitaries ignored abuses and inadvertently sanctioned
wrong behavior. Closely connected as well is the dichotomy of church law and state
law—a further obstacle to transparency (Kaufmann 2010). The negative aspects of
groupthink can be addressed by various measures. In addition to internal strategies,
for instance, implementing a culture of critical examination, an outside perspective
can improve matters (Janis 1972). The visitations could have been the element to
bring in the urgently required diversity. If seriously applied and executed, a positive
preventive effect may be expected. If visitors openly address such concerns, the
repression of dealing with such taboos should be absent. However, as the analysis
illustrates, the controls have not always been implemented consistently and, by
focusing on financial issues, were no counterweight to the strong internal control
mechanisms. The case illustrates the importance of taking a holistic view of control
A focus on monastic auditing
123
systems. Internal audits are just one part in a comprehensive organizational
governance system.
As a contribution to the literature on good governance and auditing, our paper
focuses attention on a multiple orientation of control in the auditing procedures of
religious orders. It becomes obvious that a ‘‘one-fits-all’’ approach is not enough to
face the challenges. Internal audits limited to economic valuation and compliance with
the law are incomplete and do not fulfill today’s requirements anymore. Further, by
including implementation practices and additional services such as identity develop-
ment, we point to neglected aspects in the management control literature. With control
instruments applied and practiced over centuries, religious orders offer some concepts
and ideas worth considering toward better governance beyond the religious field.
7 Limitations and future research
This study has an explorative character; it is intended to stimulate further research that
would be able to overcome the limitations of this study. First, this study is limited to the
German-speaking area, as all orders who responded to our survey are located in
Germany, Switzerland and Austria. However, since all orders worldwide rely on
similar governance structures, our analysis offers a first glance into their advantages
and problems. Second, the number of reported abuse cases is quite limited. Therefore,
future research embracing larger samples of orders may be able to generate more
detailed insights on the prevention of abuse cases. Related to the limited data available
on abuse cases is another issue: Orders relying heavily on clan controls may
experience less denunciation by abused individuals as those may still feel some
obligation to the order. The latter may affect our dependent variable, however, is not
measurable at all. The insights gained through interviews helped to mitigate this issue
a little bit. Third, one needs to account for the particular characteristics of religious
orders. Certainly we do not propagate a one-to-one transfer of monastic governance
instruments (for a detailed discussion, see Inauen et al. 2010a). Circumstances vary too
widely, and an implementation depends on, for instance, the form, purpose, size,
situation or context of an organization (Alford and Hughes 2008). However, it might
be rewarding to do research into business alternatives to approach some of the
problems in governance today (Clarke 2011; Benz and Frey 2007).
Future research on multiple control systems should not only consider different
types of control and explore their relations among each other more deeply, but
should also take into account surrounding conditions as the impact of implemen-
tation practices. Different starting points are conceivable precisely because similar
control instruments already exist. For instance, the internal audit in many
organizations encompasses the efficiency of processes and compliance with law
and regulations. Broadening the scope of internal audit procedures is likely to play
an increasingly important role in the future.
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Table 8 Correlations
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 Control types
2 Focus on process &
clan control
-0.30*
3 Sexual abuse -0.01 -0.28*
4 Abuse—rule violations 0.03 -0.30* 0.69*
5 Frequency -0.09 -0.22* 0.12 0.10
6 Identity development -0.01 0.08 -0.12 -0.26* -0.03
7 Canons regular -0.03 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.49* -0.07
8 Monastic orders -0.09 -0.20 0.31* 0.29* 0.37* -0.03 -0.13
9 Mendicant orders 0.22* -0.08 -0.19 -0.26* -0.06 0.10 -0.27*
10 Congregations 0.03 0.06 -0.15 -0.04 -0.13 -0.09 -0.19
11 Child and youth work 0.00 -0.08 0.29* 0.26* -0.03 0.03 0.00
12 Germany 0.09 -0.06 0.17 0.07 -0.12 0.07 -0.05
13 Austria -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.15 0.09 -0.07 0.19
14 Number of members 0.03 -0.11 0.28* 0.31* 0.27* -0.07 0.11
15 Mean age 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.21* -0.07 -0.31*
8 9 10 11 12 13 14
9 Mendicant orders -0.30*
10 Congregations -0.21* -0.44*
11 Child and youth work 0.14 -0.13 -0.02
12 Germany -0.24* 0.05 0.15 0.14
13 Austria 0.13 -0.08 -0.22* -0.10 -0.57*
14 Number of members 0.40* -0.33* 0.08 0.13 0.05 0.01
15 Mean age -0.04 -0.02 0.28* 0.02 -0.02 -0.34 0.10*
Means and standard deviations are displayed in Tables 2 and 3
* p \ 0.05; N = 96
A focus on monastic auditing
123
References
Abernethy, M. A., & Chua, W. F. (1996). A field study of control system ‘‘redesign’’: The impact of
institutional processes on strategic choice. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(2), 569–606.
Adler, P. S., & Borys, B. (1996). Two types of bureaucracy: Enabling and coercive. Administrative
Science Quarterly, 41, 61–89.
Alford, J., & Hughes, O. (2008). Public value pragmatism as the next phase of public management.
American Review of Public Administration, 38(2), 130–148.
Alvesson, M., Ashcraft, K. L., & Thomas, R. (2008). Identity matters: Reflections on the construction of
identity scholarship in organization studies. Organization, 15(1), 5–28.
Alvesson, M., & Ka¨rreman, D. (2004). Interfaces of control. Technocratic and socio-ideological control
in a global management consultancy firm. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(3/4), 423.
Ambos, B., & Schlegelmilch, B. B. (2007). Innovation and control in the multinational firm: A
comparison of political and contingency approaches. Strategic Management Journal, 28(5),
473–486.
Anthony, R. N., & Govindarajan, V. (2008). Management control systems (12th ed.). Boston, MA:
McGraw-Hill.
Bachman, R., Gillespie, N., & Kramer, R. (2011). Call for papers for a special issue on trust in crisis:
Organizational and institutional trust, failures and repair. Organization Studies, 32(8), 1139–1141.
Bebchuk, L. A., & Fried, J. M. (2005). Pay without performance: Overview of the issues. Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance, 17(4), 8–23.
Benz, M., & Frey, B. S. (2007). Corporate governance: What can we learn from public governance?
Academy of Management Review, 32(1), 92–104.
Betz, H. D., Browning, D. S., Janowski, B., & Ju¨ngel, E. (2005). Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart.
Handwo¨rterbuch fu¨r Theologie und Religionswissenschaft (4th ed., Vol. 8). Tu¨bingen: Mohr
Siebeck Verlag.
Beuroner Benediktinerkongregation. (2003). Die Visitation der Klo¨ster. Internal law‘ Directorium
Spirituale, Chapter V. Maria Laach Abbey, Germany.
Brenner, S., & Schwalbach, J. (2009). Legal institutions, board diligence, and top executive pay.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(1), 1–12.
Caglio, A., & Ditillo, A. (2008). A review and discussion of management control in inter-firm
relationships: Achievements and future directions. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7–8),
865–898.
Cardinal, L. B. (2001). Technological innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: The use of
organizational control in managing research and development. Organization Science, 12(1), 19–36.
Cardinal, L. B., Sitkin, S. B., & Long, C. P. (2004). Balancing and rebalancing in the creation and
evolution of organizational control. Organization Science, 15(4), 411–431.
Cardinal, L. B., Sitkin, S. B., & Long, C. P. (2010). A configurational theory of control. In S. B. Sitkin, L.
B. Cardinal, & K. M. Bijlsma-Frankema (Eds.), Organizational control (pp. 51–79). New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press.
Carlsson-Wall, M., Kraus, K., & Lind, J. (2011). The interdependencies of intra- and interorganisational
controls and work practices—the case of domestic care of the elderly. Management Accounting
Research, 22(4), 313–329.
Chava, S., & Purnanandam, A. (2010). CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies. Journal of
Financial Economics, 97(2), 263–278.
Chenhall, R. H. (2003). Management control systems design within its organizational context: Findings
from contingency-based research and directions for the future. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 28(2/3), 127–168.
Clarke, D. C. (2011). ‘‘Nothing but wind’’? The past and future of comparative corporate governance.
American Journal of Comparative Law, 59(1), 75–110.
Codex Iuris Canonici. (1983). Canon law of the Catholic Church. 1 October 2011. http://www.intratext.
com/IXT/ ENG0017/_INDEX.HTM.
Dart, R. (2004). Being ‘‘business-like’’ in a nonprofit organization: A grounded and inductive typology.
Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 23, 290–310.
De Charms, R. (1968). Personal causation: The internal affective determinants of behavior. New York,
NY: Academic Press.
E. Inauen et al.
123
Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A meta-analytic review of experiments examining the
effects of extrinsic rewards on intrinsic motivation. Psychological Bulletin, 125, 627–668.
Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (1980). The empirical exploration of intrinsic motivational processes. In L.
Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 13, pp. 39–80). New York, NY:
Academic Press.
Dent, J. F. (1990). Strategy, organization and control: Some possibilities for accounting research.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15(1/2), 3–25.
Die Zeit Online. (2010). Chronologie der U¨bergriffe. May 18, 2010 http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/
zeitgeschehen/2010-04/sexueller-missbrauch-chronologie.
Di Pietra, R., McLeay, S., & Ronen, J. (2010). Special issue on governance and accounting regulation.
Journal of Management and Governance, 14(4), 273–276.
Ehrmann, T., Rost, K., & Inauen, E. (2013). Location of decision rights in Catholic religious orders.
Managerial and Decision Economics, 34(1), 29–39.
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1985). Control—organizational and economic approaches. Management Science,
31(2), 134–149.
Engelbert, P. (2009). Zwischen Regel und Reform: Zur Geschichte des Benediktinerordens. In C. Schu¨tz
& P. Rath (Eds.), Der Benediktinerorden. Gott suchen in Gebet und Arbeit. Ostfildern: Matthias
Gru¨newald Verlag.
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law and Economics,
26, 327–349.
Feinberg, K. (2011). Compensating company executives under the troubled asset relief program.
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(5), 492–496.
Ferreira, A., & Otley, D. (2009). The design and use of performance management systems: An extended
framework for analysis. Management Accounting Research, 20(4), 263–282.
Fisher, J. G. (1998). Contingency theory, management control systems and firm outcomes: Past results
and future directions. Behavioral Research in Accounting, 10, 47–64.
Flamholtz, E. G., Das, T. K., & Tsui, A. S. (1985). Toward an integrative framework of organizational
control. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 10(1), 35–50.
Fortado, B. (1994). Informal supervisory social-control strategies. Journal of Management Studies, 31(2),
251–274.
Franciscans. (2007). The special statutes for the canonical visitation and presidency of the provincial
chapter 2001. Rome, Italy: Franciscan Order.
Frey, B. S. (1992). Tertium datur: Pricing, regulating and intrinsic motivation. Kyklos, 45, 161–184.
Frey, B. S. (1997). Not just for the money: An economic theory of personal motivation. Cheltenham,
Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Frey, B. S., Homberg, F., & Osterloh, M. (2013). Organizational Control Systems and pay for
performance in the Public Service. Organization Studies, 34(7), 949–972.
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2001). Motivation crowding theory: A survey of empirical evidence. Journal of
Economic Surveys, 15(5), 589–611.
Frey, B. S., & Osterloh, M. (Eds.). (2002). Successful management by motivation: Balancing intrinsic and
extrinsic incentives. Berlin: Springer.
Frieb, K. (2006). Kirchenvisitation und Kommunikation. Die Akten zu den Visitationen in der
Kuroberpfalz unter Ludwig VI (pp. 1576–1583). Munich: Beck.
Frost, J., Osterloh, M., & Weibel, A. (2010). Governing knowledge work: Transactional and
transformational solutions. Organizational Dynamics, 39(2), 126–136.
Frost, J., Vogel, R., & Bagban, K. (2012). Towards a combinative approach to management control: How
control mechanisms interact in a multi-business firm. Working paper presented at EGOS 2012
Helsinki.
Fryxell, G. E., Dooley, R. S., & Vryza, M. (2002). After the ink dries: The interaction of trust and control
in US-based international joint ventures. Journal of Management Studies, 39(6), 865–886.
George, E., & Qian, C. (2010). Organizational identity and control: can the two go together? In S.
B. Sitkin, L. B. Cardinal, & K. M. Bijlsma-Frankema (Eds.), Organizational control (pp. 167–190).
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Gerdin, J. (2005). Management accounting system design in manufacturing departments: An empirical
investigation using a multiple contingencies approach. Accounting, Organizations and Society,
30(2), 99–126.
Grandori, A., & Soda, G. (2006). A relational approach to organization design. Industry & Innovation,
13(2), 151–172.
A focus on monastic auditing
123
Grant, G. H. (2003). The evolution of corporate governance and its impact on modern corporate America.
Management Decision, 41(3), 923–934.
Grant, R. M. (2011). Reflections on knowledge-based approaches to the organization of production.
Journal of Management & Governance, online first 13 December 2011, pp. 1–18.
Hausmann, Y., & Bechtold-Orth, E. (2010). Changing remuneration systems in Europe and the United
States—a legal analysis of recent developments in the wake of the financial crisis. European
Business Organization Law Review, 11(2), 195–229.
Hein, M. (2005). Visitation. In D. Betz, D. S. Browning, B. Janowski, & E. Ju¨ngel (Eds.), Religion in
Geschichte und Gegenwart. Handwo¨rterbuch fu¨r Theologie und Religionswissenschaft. Tu¨bingen:
Mohr Siebeck Verlag.
Helvetia Sacra. (1986). Die Orden mit Benediktinerregel. Fru¨he Klo¨ster, die Benediktiner und
Benediktinerinnen in der Schweiz, Vol. 3/1/1. Bern, Switzerland: Francke.
Hilb, M. (2011). Redesigning corporate governance: Lessons learnt from the global financial crisis.
Journal of Management and Governance, 15(4), 533–538.
Hirnsperger, J. (2001). Visitation II. Kirchenrechtlich. In M. Buchberger, W. Kasper, K. Baumgartner
(Eds.), Lexikon fu¨r Theologie und Kirche. Freiburg i. Br.: Herder Verlag.
Holmstro¨m, B., & Milgrom, P. (1991). Multitask principal-agent analyses: Incentive contracts, asset
ownership, and job design. Journal of Law Economics and Organization, 7, 24–52.
Holtz, L. (2001). Geschichte des christlichen Ordenslebens. Du¨sseldorf: Patmos.
Inauen, E., Rost, K., Frey, B. S., Homberg, F., & Osterloh, M. (2010a). Monastic governance: Forgotten
prospects for public institutions. American Review of Public Administration, 40(6), 631–653.
Inauen, E., Rost, K., Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2010b). Back to the future: A monastic perspective on
corporate governance. Management Revue, 21(10), 38–59.
Janis, I. L. (1972). Victims of groupthink. A psychological study of foreign policy decisions and fiascos.
Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Jensen, M. C. (2003). Paying people to lie: The truth about the budgeting process. European Financial
Management, 9(3), 379–406.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, H. W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Jensen, M. C., & Murphy, K. J. (1990). Performance, pay and top-management incentives. Journal of
Political Economy, 98, 225–264.
Jensen, M. C., Murphy, K. J., & Wruck, E. G. (2004). Remuneration: Where we’ve been, how we got to
here, what are the problems, and how to fix them. Negotiation, organizations and markets. Harvard
Business School NOM Research Paper No. 04-28, Harvard.
Johnson, S. (2011). The next financial crisis. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 19(5),
489–491.
Johnson, S. A., Ryan, H. E, Jr, & Tyan, I. S. (2009). Managerial incentives and corporate fraud: The
sources of incentives matter. Review of Finance, 13(1), 115–145.
Kaufmann, F.-X. (2010). Moralische Lethargie in der Kirche. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 96, 8.
Keevers, L., Treleaven, L., Sykes, C., & Darcy, M. (2011). Made to measure: Taming practices with
results- based accountability. Organization Studies, 33(1), 97–120.
Kennedy, F. A., & Widener, S. K. (2008). A control framework: Insights from evidence on lean
accounting. Management Accounting Research, 19(4), 301–323.
Kieser, A. (1987). From asceticism to administration of wealth. Medieval monasteries and the pitfalls of
rationalization. Organization Studies, 8(2), 103–123.
Kirkpatrick, G. (Ed.) (2009). The corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis. Report by OECD
steering group on corporate governance, pp. 1–30.
Kirsch, L. (1996). The management of complex tasks in organizations: Controlling the systems
development process. Organization Science, 7(1), 1–21.
Kirsch, L. J., Ko, D. G., & Haney, M. H. (2010). Investigating the antecedents of team-based clan control:
Adding social capital as a predictor. Organization Science, 21(2), 469–489. Lexisnexis University.
Reed Elsevier Inc.
McGrath, P. (2007). Knowledge management in monastic communities of the Medieval Irish Celtic
Church. Journal of Management History, 13(2), 211–223.
Magnan, M., & Markarian, G. (2011). Accounting, governance and the crisis: Is risk the missing link?
European Accounting Review, 20(2), 215–231.
Malmi, T., & Brown, D. A. (2008). Management control systems as a package-opportunities, challenges
and research directions. Management Accounting Research, 19(4), 287–300.
E. Inauen et al.
123
Martinez, J. I., & Jarillo, J. C. (1989). The evolution of research on coordination mechanisms in
multinational corporations. Journal of International Business Studies, 20(3), 489–514.
Meier, D. M. (2006). Klo¨sterliche Finanzvisitation. Anforderungen an ein internes Kontrollsystem. In K.
Lu¨dicke, H. Paarhammer, & D. A. Binder (Eds.), Kirche in einer sa¨kularisierten Gesellschaft (pp.
405–420). Innsbruck: Studienverlag.
Merchant, K. A., & Otley, D. T. (2007). A review of the literature on control and accountability. In C.
S. Chapman, A. G. Hopwood, & M. D. Shields (Eds.), Handbook of management accounting
research (Vol. 2, pp. 785–802). Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Merchant, K. A., & Van der Stede, W. A. (2012). Management control systems: Performance
measurement, evaluation and incentives (3rd ed.). New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Meyer, M. W. (2003). Rethinking performance measurement. Beyond the balanced scorecard. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press.
Meyer, M. W., & Gupta, W. (1994). The performance paradox. Research in Organizational Behavior, 16,
309–369.
Mu¨ller, G. (2003). Theologische Realenzyklopa¨die., 35 Berlin & New York, NY: De Gruyter.
O’Donnell, S. W. (2000). Managing foreign subsidiaries: Agents of headquarters, or an interdependent
network? Strategic Management Journal, 21(5), 525–548.
Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2006). Shareholders should welcome knowledge workers as directors.
Journal of Management and Governance, 10(3), 325–345.
Osterloh, M., & Weibel, A. (2006). Investition Vertrauen. Prozesse der Vertrauensentwicklung in
Organisationen. Wiesbaden: Gabler.
Osterloh, M., & Weibel, A. (2008). Managing motivation—Verdra¨ngung und Versta¨rkung der
intrinsischen Motivation aus Sicht der psychologischen O¨konomik. Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches
Studium (WiSt), 8, 406–411.
Otley, D. T. (1980). The contingency theory of management accounting: Achievement and prognosis.
Accounting, Organizations and Society, 5(4), 413–428.
Ouchi, W. G. (1977). The relationship between organizational structure and organizational control.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 22, 95–113.
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for the design of organizational control mechanisms.
Management Science, 25, 833–848.
Ouchi, W. (1980). Markets, bureaucracies, and clans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 25, 129–141.
Perry, J. L., Engbers, T. A., & Jun, S. J. (2009). Back to the future? Performance-related pay, empirical
research, and the perils of persistence. Public Administration Review, 69(1), 39–51.
Peters, C. (2003). Visitation I. In Theologische Realenzyklopa¨die. Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.
Pirson, M., & Turnbull, S. (2011). Toward a more humanistic governance model: Network governance
structures. Journal of Business Ethics, 99(1), 101–114.
Premonstratensians. (1997). Konstitutionen des regulierten Chorherrenordens der Pra¨monstratenser:
Visitationsordnung. Premonstratensian Order. Rome.
Rajan, R. (2010). Fault lines: How hidden fractures still threaten the world economy. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Rodrigue, M., Magnan, B. & Boulianne, E. (2013). Stakeholders’ influence on environmental strategy and
performance indicators: A managerial perspective. Management Accounting Research, 24(4),
301–306.
Rost, K., Inauen, E., Osterloh, M., & Frey, B. S. (2010). Corporate Governance: What can stock
corporations learn from monasteries? Journal of Management History, 16(1), 90–115.
Rost, K., & Osterloh, M. (2009). Management fashion pay-for-performance. Schmalenbachs Business
Review, 61(2), 119–149.
Salesians (1984). Allgemeine Satzungen der Salesianer Don Boscos. Salesian Order. Rome.
Sandelin, M. (2008). Operation of management control practices as a package. A case study on control
system variety in a growth firm context. Management Accounting Research, 19(4), 324–343.
Schmelzer, G. (1979). Religio¨se Gruppen und sozialwissenschaftliche Typologie. Mo¨glichkeiten der
soziologischen Analyse religio¨ser Orden. Sozialwissenschaftliche Abhandlungen der Go¨rres-
Gesellschaft. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
Schwaiger, G. (2003). Mo¨nchtum, Orden, Klo¨ster. Von den Anfa¨ngen bis zur Gegenwart. Munich: Beck.
Schwaiger, G., & Heim, M. (2008). Orden und Klo¨ster: das christliche Mo¨nchtum in der Geschichte (3rd
ed.). Munich: Beck.
Simons, R. (1990). The role of management control systems in creating competitive advantage: New
perspectives. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 15(1–2), 127–143.
A focus on monastic auditing
123
Simons, R. (1995). Control in an age of empowerment. Harvard Business Review, 73(2), 80–88.
Simons, R. (2000). Performance Measurement & Control Systems for implementing Strategy. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Sitkin, S. B., Cardinal, L. B., & Bijlsma-Frankema, K. M. (Eds.). (2010). Organizational control. New
York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Snider, L. (2009). Accommodating power: the ‘‘common sense’’ of regulators. Social & Legal Studies,
18(2), 179–197.
Spiegel Online. (2011). Sexueller Missbrauch in der katholischen Kirche. Jan. 8, 2011. http://www.
spiegel.de/thema/sexueller_missbrauch_in_der_katholischen_kirche.
St. John, C. H., & Harrison, J. S. (1999). Manufacturing-based relatedness, synergy, and coordination.
Strategic Management Journal, 20(2), 129–145.
Sun, W., Stewart, J., & Pollard, D. (2011). Corporate governance and the global financial crisis:
International perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tajfel, H. (1981). Human groups and social categories: Studies in social psychology. CUP Archive.
Thompson, J. D. (1967). Organizations in action. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
Turner, K. L., & Makhija, M. V. (2006). The role of organizational controls in managing knowledge.
Academy of Management Review, 31(1), 197–217.
Tyler, T. R., & Blader, S. L. (2000). Cooperation in groups: procedural justice, social identity, and
behavioral engagement. Philadelphia, US: Psychology Press.
Weaver, G. R. (2006). Virtue in organizations: Moral identity as a foundation for moral agency.
Organization Studies, 27(3), 341–368.
Weibel, A. (2007). Voluntary work behaviors, habilitation manuscript. Zurich: University of Zurich.
Wragg, E.C., Haynes, G. S., Wragg, C. M., & Chamberlin, R. P. (2004). Performance pay for teachers:
The experiences of heads and teachers. London, UK & New York, NY: Routledge Falmer.
Emil Inauen works at the Institute of Organization and Administrative Science and the Institute for
Empirical Research in Economics at the University of Zurich. His primary research interest is the
economics of religion. Before starting his study of economics he worked as a teacher of religion for
several years and has experienced the monastic life.
Margit Osterloh is Professor (em.) for Business Administration and Management of Technology and
Innovation at the University of Zu¨rich, Switzerland. She is Research Director of CREMA (Center for
Research in Economics, Management, and the Arts). Margit Osterloh holds a honorary doctorate from
Leuphana University Lu¨neburg. She was a member of Deutscher Wissenschaftsrat (German Council for
Science and Humanities) until 2011 and a board member of three companies in Switzerland and
Germany. Her main research areas are organization design, corporate governance, research governance,
knowledge management, and gender issues.
Bruno S. Frey was Professor of Economics at the University of Constance from 1970 to 1977, and at the
University of Zurich from 1977 to 2012. He has been Distinguished Professor of Behavioural Science at
the Warwick Business School at the University of Warwick, UK, and is Professor at Zeppelin University
Friedrichshafen, Germany. He is Research Director of CREMA (Center for Research in Economics,
Management, and the Arts). He received honorary doctorates in economics from the Universities of St.
Gallen (Switzerland 1998), Goeteborg (Sweden 1998), the Free University of Brussels (Belgium 2009),
the University of Aix-en-Provence/Marseille (France 2010), and the University of Innsbruck (Austria
2011).
Fabian Homberg is Senior Lecturer at Bournemouth University. He holds a doctorate from the
University of Zurich. His current research interests are motivation and incentives in private and public
sector organizations, top management team diversity, and decision making biases.
E. Inauen et al.
123
